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PREFAOE 
The purpose ot this thesis is to clarity the difference 
between the divine attributes of omnipresence and immensity. TO 
do so, the writer has integrated the notions of place and space, 
as understood in a scholastic oosmology, with the above-mentione 
attributes of God, and he has shown the attribute of Lmffiensity t 
be the greater perfection. 
An tmportant phase of this thesis is the olarification 
of the traditionally scholastic notions of place and space for a 
better understanding of the significance of the attributes of 
omnipresenoe and tmffiensity. It is likewise vary important to have 
stressed the teaohing of st. Thomas, as found partioularly in the 
summa Theologica, tor a more thorough understanding of Godts spe-
cial mode of presence. 
The author has found it necessary to make many trans-
lations of his own from the Latin. Throughout the thesis, there-
fore, translations are his, unless the name of the translator is 
given. 
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CHAP'l'ER I 
THE .4.PPROACH TO GOD 
From the time of their tormulation. 80me eiSh\ oen-
turies ago, the five proofs 01' st. Thomas for the existenoe of 
God have beoome olassio. The ultimate reason tor this is not to 
be tound in the taot that Thomas Aquinas has formulated thafJ.. 
nor in any other of a host of extrinsic explanations. Rather do 
these proots rest upon their intrinsic oharaoteristics and worth. 
It is true that many other argufllents have been otfered to prove 
the existenoe of God which are, in the opinion of many. as equal-
ly forceful as those proposed by Thomas. But nonetheless the 
widespread aoolaim whioh has been afforded these proofs seems, 
as it were, from their over-all metaphysioal nature. 
Betore anything oan be said of God's essenoe or His 
attributes, it is neoessary to indioate brietly the general pat-
tern of the tive proofs for a better understanding of why God is 
spoken of as the Immovable Mover, the unoaused cause, the Neoes-
sary and supremely Perfeot Being, as well as the Infinite Ruler 
of the universe.1 
1 A detailed analysis of these proofs may be found in 
APpendix I of this work. 
1 
2 
• In all five of these arguments st. Thomas bases his 
conclusions on an empirioal fact which he introduces as the 
major premiss of the argument. The principle of sUffioient rea-
son, at times formulated as the prinoiple of causality or of fi-
nality, serves as the minor in an effort to aocount for the data 
of experienoe. The oonclusion of each argument is a demand for 
the existenoe of a Being Who has within Himself the sUffioient 
reason for His own existenoe as well as the existenoe of the data 
attested to by experienoe, 
From the existenoe of motion in the world, st. Thomas 
is able to prove the existenoe of an Immovable Mover to aocount 
for that motion. Although he does not mention the fact in his 
actual proof from motion, the oonoept ot an Immovable MOTer oon-
tains the notion ot pure Aot. A mover may be referred to as aot, 
because he acts only insotar as he is in aot; and an Immovable 
Mover is nothing else but aot, because what is in potenoy is 
movable as regards the act to whioh it is in potenoy. Therefore 
an Immovable Mover is pure Aot. having no potenoy tor a further 
aot. 2 st. Thomas reserves oonsiderations suoh as these tor his 
2 See Qarolus Boyer, S. J. t cursus Philosophiae. Paris 
1935, II, 310-311. 
rtThe first Immovable Mover is Pure Aot, or God. This 
part indeed needs only a briet deolaration. For a mover is aot, 
sinoe he aots only insofar as he is in act; and an lmmovable 
Mover is aot alone, sinoe what is in potenoy is movable toward 
the aot to whioh it is in potency. Therefore an Immovable Mover 
is pure Aot.« 
3 
• 
aotual treatment of the essenoe and the attributes of GOd. Howe-
ver, it is profitable to note in passing the oontent of suoh no-
tions as the Immovable Mover, for they give a basis and serve 
as the foundation for the vast storehouse of a reasoned know-
ledge of God's 8s88noe. 3 
In the seoond argument St. Thomas proceeds from the 
existenoe of an order of effioi8nt oauses in the world to the 
existenoe of an Uncaused Cause. This Uncaused. Unoonditioned, and 
First Cause must be Its own action and Its own beins, since, as 
Thomas himself remarks, operation follows being, and the mode of 
operation the mode of being.' He further points out, when dis-
cussing the nature and the attributes of God, that this First 
Cause is in reality selt-subsisting Being, completely independent 
of all other beings. 5 
In the third way st. Thomas argues from the existence 
of a being which 1s possible to be or not to be to the existence 
ot a necessary be1ng whose necessity 1s caused by no other--a 
3 S •• John F. MoOormick, S. J., Natural Theol0§l. 
Chicago, 1943, 95. 
"Having built up our idea of God by a posteriori rea-
soning from the evidenoe which the human mind In the exeroise of 
its natural powers is able to find in the universe around us. ,we 
now prooeed to follow out what is implied in the idea so built 
up." 
4 S. T., It q. 25, a. 2, Basic writings of st. Thomas 
Aquinas, ed. Anton C. pegis, New Yori, 1945, I, 241. 
5 S. T •• I, q. 3, a. 4, Basic writings, ed. Pegis, I. 
4 
• Being, therefore, Who has within Himself the sUffioient reason 
for His own existenoe. 
The fourth Thomistic argument for the existence of God 
rests upon the grades of perfection which are round in the 
world. It must be noticed, however, that not all perfections are 
regarded in this argument, but only those which admit of de-
grees. 6 Suoh are the transoendental perfections of unity, truth, 
goodness, and beauty. suoh also are accidental perfeotions, such 
as heat, wisdom, and holiness. As regards substantial or essen-
tial perfections, some admit of degrees, as does life, but others 
such as humanity do not. Here again the principle ot sufficient 
reason demands the existenoe of the supremely £'ertect Being to 
aooount for the varied degrees of perfection in the world. 
In the major of the fitth argument, from the gove~nance 
of the world, recourse is had onoe again to a fact of experience. 
It is evident that natural beings., lacking intelligence, do at-
tain their ends oonstantly and designedly. TO explain this con-
stantly recurring phenomenon. the principle of SUfficient reason 
taking the form now of the prinoiple of finality is invoked. And 
the conclusion that a Being Who is endowed with supreme lntelli-
6 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, o. P •• The One God, 
trans. Dom Bede Rose, O. S. B., st. Louis, 1943, 146. 
~we are oonoerned with the absolute perfeotions of 
being, truth, goodness, predioated of different things in vary-
ing degrees ••• " 
5 
gence must ~xist is an obvious one. 
There are, it is true, other arguments whioh have been 
offered down the ages to prove the existence of God, some of 
which are more readily lmderstood and perhaps more cogent in 
their suasive power. Nevertheless, the widespread acclaim affor-
ded these proofs of Thomas is substantiated in the OVer-all mete-
. 
physical mature of the proofs. Their force is undeniable. .i£i thar 
the existence of God must be admitted, or the prinoiple of suffi-
cient reason must be denied. 7 The reason for this is that 'fever 
being whioh is contingent, changeable, composite, imperfeot, and 
relati va is caused," and henoe a first and unchangeable ~)eing, 
Who ts essentially and absolutely perfect, must exist.8 Doubtin 
or denying the principle of sufficient reason would involve the 
doubting or denying of the principle of oontradiotion. since a 
oontingent beipg, having no reuson for existence, could not be 
distinguished from nothingness. 
1R the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God, the 
prime Mover, the First Ca~se. the Necessary Being, the Most per-
fect Being, and the Ruler of the universe is shown to be His own 
• 
7 Etienne Gilson J 'l'he Philosophy of st. Thomas Aqui-
nas, trans. Edward Bullough, ed. Rev. G. A. Elrington, b. "P., 
cambridge, England, 1929, 94. 
"At bottom ••• there is not one of the proofs that does 
not demonstrate God to be the sole oonceivable oause of the sense 
experience from which the proof has set out ••• ex nihilo, nihil 
fit." 
8 Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 154. 
action, and theretore His own existence. In Him alone are es-
s,.::nce and existence identified. 9 This is the golden key to the 
whole treatise on the one God, and its "dominating principle."lO 
In the proofs tor Godts existence it is necessary to 
proceed by a posteriori argumentation, building up an idea of 
God trom what the human reason is capable ot exhausting from the 
ltmited, finite, and contingent world about it. It seeks to know 
the cause of the wondrous effects it daily beholds. 'l'he proofs 
thus tar have hinted to the inquiring searcher something of the 
majesty of God. But he wishes to know more of the essence of that 
supreme aeing, the First Mover, the Uncaused Cause, the Necessary 
and Absolutely perfect .eing, the supreme Ordainer of all things. 
The starting point of a study of the essence and the attributes 
of God is had in the nature ot God as expressed in the proots for 
His existence.ll A priori reasoning will oharacterize the tur-
ther inquiry into the nature of God. 
Since the human reason cannot ade~luately encotnpass the 
nature of God in anyone conoept, it must use terms atter a hu-
man pattern, distinguishing conceptually between the divine es-
9 The sum~a contra Gentiles of st. Thomas A~.inast 
Lib. I, o. 21, literally translated by the Eiiglish Dominican fi'a-
thers. London, 1924, 61. 
10 Garrigou-Lagrange. The One God, 153. 
11 Mooormick, Natural Theology. 95. 
7 
• 
senoe and its attributes end between the divine attributes them-
selves, not, however, maintaining that suoh a distinotion is to 
be found in the reality whioh is God.12 
When the human mind begins to delve into the problem 
01' the nature of' God. it asks itself the (lUestion: What is God? 
The answer oould be given either with regard to His physioal es-
senoe or His metaphysioal essenoe. This distinotion is made to 
aooord with the notions of what God's essenoe is in Itself, and 
what It is oonoeived of' by mankind, sinoe the human reason oan-
not know God as He is in Himself. 13 The physioal essenoe of 
God, the reality which He is. can only be the "one absolutely 
simple reality whioh is His fulness of Being."14 The human 
reason oan, however. arrive at a knowledge of the metaphysioal 
essence of God which ls. as it were, an Instr~~ent or means to 
an understanding of the physioal essenoe of God. The metaphysi-
cal essenoe of God will be given in terms of that note which the 
human reason oonoeives as the primary oonstituent of God as God; 
likewise will it be that note whioh is oonoeived as the root and 
12 Ibid. 
13 contra Gentiles, Lib. It o. 14, trans. gnglish Do-
minioans, 33. 
"In treating of the divine essenoe the prinoipal me-
thod to be tollowed is that of remotion; for the divine essenoe 
by its UL~ensity surpasses every form to whioh our intelleot rea-
ohes; and thus we oannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But 
we have some knowledge of 1t by knowing what it is not." 
14 Mccormiok. Natural Theology, 99. 
8 
the souroe of all other perfeotions, and that note which·will 
distinguish God from all other beings.15 
It is important to establish a oertain definite order 
in treating the essenoe and the attributes of God. As was men-
tioned above, the metaphysioal essence of God will be a oertain 
note whioh will serve as the root of all other perfeotions whioh 
are found in God. It is necessary, therefore, to treat first of 
that one note and then prooeed with the disoussion of God's at-
tributes. 
st. Thomas has suffioiently demonstrated that there 
does exist a First cause. But the First Vause is a Being of It-
self, a Being through Its very essenoe. or a Necessary Being. 
This is evident, since G oause which depended upon another being 
could not be first. To say. moreover, that something exists of 
itself is to imply that it have within itself the suffioient rea-
son for its existenoe, and hence that it exists by its own es-
sence, and not by participation. Likewise, whatever is had essen-
tially is had neoessarily, Just as man. if he exists, neoessarily 
1s rational. Therefore God necessarily exists, or He is a Neoes-
sary Being. l & 
AS a consequent of God's being the Necessary Being, it 
15 Boyer, aurslis philosophiae, II, 357. 
16 Ibid., 358. 
is olearly ev1dent that He is His very existenoe and that He i8 
Infinitely Perfect. As a proof of the former assertion, it need 
only be pointed out that only that very act of ex1stence is suoh 
that it exists by its very nature; other things are, only inso-
far as they reoeive it. Wherefore. were God not Existenoe Itself, 
He would be a caused and partioipated being. Therefore God is 
EXistenoe Itself,l? whioh means that in Him essenoe and existence 
are really identitied.1S 
From the faot that God is Existenoe Itself, it readily 
tollows that He is Infinitely Perfeot, sinoe all perfeotions are 
found in Him in the highest degree, as is made manifest from the 
very nature of a being wh10h is gxistenoe Itself. A being enjoys 
that pOBtion of perfeotion whioh" it reoeives from the aot of 
existing. The essenoe of a being diotates that portion of the 80 
of existenoe whioh that being is to reoeive. However that being 
whioh is EXistenoe Itself i8 the unreoeived Pure Aot ofexia-
tenoe, and, as it is so, it oontains within Itself no prinoiple 
of limitation whatsoever, and henoe enjoys the fullest perfeotio 
of existenoe. The words of St. Thomas are outstanding in olarity: 
"Thus God in His very existence has all perfections."19 
17 Ibid. 
18 st. Thomas Aquinas, De Rate et Essentia, Marietti 
edition. Rome, 1948. 17-18. 
19 Ibid., 18. 
10 
• The question as to the metaphysioal esaenoe of God has 
been raised. but apparently no deoision has been made as to what 
would oonstitute that essenoe. Boyer studies the opinions which 
were offered by the Nominalists, such as Oocam, by the scotists, 
and by John of st. Thomaa. 20 occam. asserted that God's metaphy ... 
sical essence consisted in his actual infinity, or the surplus 
01' perfeotions which are God's. However the sum of all Godts per 
fections oonstitutes His physical. rather than His metaphysical, 
essence. The scotiets olaimed that His metaphysioal •• sence oon-
sists in His radical infinity, whioh is the need of extolling to 
the infinite whatever is predicated of God. But first 01' all, 
the reason tor suoh a predication must be found, and this reason 
itself will be the metaphysical essence of God. John Of st. Tho-
mes said that the metaphysical essenoe of God is round in His 
lm:n.ateriality or intellectuality. notes which are actually the 
source of other perfections. but it is ~ot primarily conceived 
nor primarily constitutive, since it is deduced from other notes, 
and especially from the notion of Existenoe Itself. 
For the above reasons. Boyer Oonoludes that the meta-
physical essenoe of God is to be assigned to the fact that He is 
Existence Itself. nor a being by His essence, or a neoessary 
20 The opinions whioh are cited here are Boyer's in-
terpretations. His critioisms of these opinions are to be found 
in the same plaoe. Boyer, cursus Philosophiae. II. 360. 
11 
Being, all of whioh mutually imply one another; nor does Aseity 
seem to mean anything different. n21 The. notion of Existence It-
self, however. is the primarily oonstitutive reason of God's es-
sence. For the identity of God's essenoe with His existenoe is 
the reason for His being a Being by His essenoe, a Necessary Be-
ing, and a Being dependent upon no other. Upon this notion, there-
fore, depend all other predioations which the human reason makes 
of G04. 22 
Sinoe the metaphysioal essenoe of God oonsists in the 
faot that He is Existenoe Itself. the perfeotions whioh are pre-
dioated of God will have their foundation in this essenoe. st. 
Thomas oonoeived an attribute to be anything whioh Oan be pre-
dioated of a subJeot. He oonsidered, therefore, Infinity to be 
one of the attributes of ood. 23 However, in a much more restrio-
ted sense, an attribute is understood as a perfeotion whioh is 
oonoeived as flowing from an essenoe, and henoe the divine at-
tributes will be oertain predioates, flowing from the divine es-
senoe. whioh are properly and oonversely referred to God. They 
are not simple metaphors, but proper attributes. They oan only 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 MCCormiok, Natural Theoloer. 113. 
12 
be applied to God. 24 
Before speaking of the various attributes of God, it 
is necessary to keep in mind that these attributes are not really 
distinct one from the other. If a real distinction is applied to 
any nature, there must be a real composition in that nature. 
Hence in God there oan be no a.ccidents. All perfections which are 
found in Him must be really identified with His essence and with 
one another. 
From what has been said above, it is evident that God 
enjoys the transcendental unity of being, since He is a being. 
However, there is a further consideration to be made: scl., whe-
ther or not the divine nature can be multiplied, or whether many 
Gods can exist. 25 Is God, of His very nature, one and unique? 
From the fact that God is existence Itself, it is clear that He 
cannot be in any genus, for He has no notes whioh could be 
shered in or common to many.26 From the faot that God is Pure 
Act. it tollows that He is not in any species as the result of 
an individual differenoe, for individuation results from mutter 
whioh cannot be found in a being who is pure Act. 27 God, there-
24 Boyer, Cursus Philosophiae, II, 376. 
25 s . .,., I. f'I 11, a. 3, Basic .iritings t ed. l'egis, 1 • , ''i • 
I. a8-90. 
26 Ibid., 89 
27 Boyer, Cursus Phllosophiu6, II, 378. 
13 
• fore oannot be multiplied. If it be su)posed that two or more in-
finite beings existGd, they would neoessarily differ as regards 
some perfeotion, and henoe they would not all enjoy the same per-
feotions, making them, therefore, less than infinite.2S 
God is, moreover, absolutely simple, having no oomposi-
tion whatsoever--whether it be substantial or aooidental, physi-
oal or metaphysioal. Sinoe all oomposition implies potentiality, 
there can be no oomposition in God Who is pure Act. 29 Quantita-
tive parts suppose matter, whioh is a potent1al principle, and 
includes the oapac1ty ot divisibility. Essential parts would be 
matter and torm, matter being in potency to form, and eaoh in po-
tenoy to the union. The composition ot essenoe and existenoe is 
exoluded by the taot that God is Existenoe Itself. Moreover, 
there are no aocidents in God, s1noe they suppose a potentiality 
in the subject ot whioh they are aots. There is no oomposit1on ot 
a nature and a supposite, since there are no aooidents in God, 
nor an existence distinct from the essence. Henoe there is no 
physical oomposition in God. That there is no metaphysical compo-
I, 89. 
I, 25-36. 
28 S. T., I, q. 11, a. 3, Basic Writings, ed. Fegis, 
29 S. T. , I, q. 3, a. 1-6, Baslc writings, ed. pegls, 
Boyer, cursus Phllosophiae, II, 376-379. 
Garrigou-Lagrange, The one God, 171-204. 
Mocormiok, Natural Tneologj. 119. 
14 
sition in Him is evident from what has been said of the Unity of 
God. 
BY divine immutability is meant that God will always be 
the same. 30 That He is immutable is evident from the fact that 
He is Pure Aot. All ohange supposes some potenoy, sinoe what is 
changed either reoeives an aot whioh it did not have or it loses 
some perfeotion whioh it did have. In the first instanoe, it is 
in potenay to the new aot, and in the seoond oase the aot whioh 
it loses is reoeived in some reoeptive potenoy. Henoe it is evi-
dent that God Who is pure Aot oannot ohange. The same oonolusion 
results from a oonsideration ot the Infinity of God as well as 
from the notion ot His simplicity. 
The divine attribute of eternity follows from the faot 
that God is i~nutable.31 That whioh is-immutable oannot have any 
real succession, sinoe this form ot 8eooe88ion, when internal, is 
a real ohange. For this reason it oannot begin, nor can it end. 
Henoe it is neoessary that God, being 1..in;nutable, be eternal. And 
since God is EXistence Itself, He perfectly and simultaneously 
It 70 ... 73. 
I, 74-84. 
30 S. T., I, q. 9, a. 1-2, Basio Writings, ed. Pegis, 
Boyer, Cursus Philosophiee, II, 381-383. 
Garrigou-Lagrange. 'tne One God, 268-275. 
Mocormiok, Natural Theology, 120-122. 
31 S. T., It q. 10, a. 1-6. Basio Writings, ed. Fegis, 
Boyer. Cursu8 Philosophiae, II, 382-383. 
Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God. 276-292. 
Mccormick, Natural Theology, 122-123. 
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• 
possesses His entire life, illustrating. as it were, the classic 
detinition of eternity offered by Boethius: "the whole and per-
fect simUltaneous possession of interminable life." 
What maybe spoken of as the fifth absolute attribute 
01' God is His im;.ensity.32 This attribute refers to God's spe-
cial mode ot presence. In keeping with His divine nature and in-
finite pertections, His mode of presenoe will be different than 
that enjoyed by a body, the human soul, or a pure spirit. Al-
though His i~~ensity necessarily tollows trom the tact that He is 
infinitely perfect, it is considered profitable to study that 
speoial presence which God enjoys. The remainder Of this thesis 
will concern itself precisely with that study. 
32 Boyer, Cursus Philosophiee, II, 383-384. 
• 
CHAPTER II 
STATE OF THE Q.U:!STION 
with what has been said of the existenoe, the essence, 
and a few of the absolute attributes of God, a sUfficient foun-
dation is established for a presentation of the purpose of this 
thesis. Only a brief mention of the immensity of God has thus 
far •• en made, but the raaainder of this work will be ooncerned, 
either direotly or indireotly, with it. 
Although it is true that an exhaustive analysis of the 
arguments for the existence ot 'Jod has not been offered. nor has 
a thorough treatment been given to the essence of God, nor, in 
deed, have all the absolute attributes of God been discussed, 
enough has been said and suffioient proofs have been offered thus 
tar for the oonolusions whioh have been proposed. There has been 
no need to discuss the Divine Knowledge or the Will of God, tor, 
although these attributes a~e themselves identioal with God's 
essence. their consideration does not have an immediate bearing 
upon this thesis. oocasion shall arise tor a discussion of a few 
of the relative attributes ot God, but it shall be more profita-
ble to reserve a oonsideration ot these until the sixth ohapter 
of this work. 
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• AS has been said above, the immensity of God is a 
divine attribute which refers to God's special mode of presence. 
It is a truism that His presence must be entirely different than 
that enjoyed by beings endowed with bodies, by the human soul, 
or by pure spirits, since His nature is essentially different 
from all of these. AS an Intini te Bein,;' J His presence should be, 
in a very real manner, endowed with oharacteristios of the Infi-
nite. His presence, in a word, should be, and is, a most unique 
one. As an Infinite Being He cannot be defined or limited to any 
one place, as quantified and otherwise limi ted ~ein,:s are;o And 
although it can be most truly affirmed that God is everywhere, 
oaution must be employed, so as not to limit His presenoe to a 
oreated being, a finite world, a very much limited universe. 
God is everywhere. He is truly omnipresent.1 However, 
He oan be said to be present only where His presence is aotual. 
He can only be actually present where there is actual space and 
actual place, namely in the world, in the created universe 
whioh here and now exists. Although He is actually present to 
all actual place and space which does exist in this created uni-
verse, His presence seems to be, as'it were. dependent upon the 
existence of this universe. To say that God is everywhere is to 
say that He is omnipresent, whioh is not an absolute attribute 
attribute of God, but rather a re10tive one, insofar as it is de-
1 S. T., I. q. 8, a. 1-4, saaie writings, ed. pegis, 
I, 63-6<d. 
---
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pendent upon the aotual existence of the world. 2 
There is, however, an absolute attribute of God whioh 
refers to His speoial mode of presenoe in the world. It is oalled 
divine immensity. As an absolute attribute, it does not depend 
upon the existence of the world. In other words, God would still 
be immense, even if the world never did exist. 
It is the purpose ot this thesis to olarify the dis-
tinotion between these two attributes of God tor a better under-
stap,d1ng of God's presenoe in thin,.ss. It will be neoessary to 
"-
treat of the diffioult oosmologioal notions of space and plaoe 
in detail, showine their divisions as well as the relation whioh 
the various types of being have to them, there'IJy assisting to 
olarity God's relation to them. 
AS regards the method whioh is to be tollowed in this 
paper. a tew things must be said. The tirst ohapter has laid the 
foundation for a logioal disoussion of these attributes of God, 
and this seoond ohapter has brought up the diffioulties whioh 
are to be disoussed as well as a few of the more important as-
pects dt the problem at hand. In the following ohapters attention 
shall be given. first of all, to a clarifioation of the terms of 
plaae, spaoe, and presence. It shall also be neoessary to discuss 
the distinotion between absolute and relative perfections, tor 
this distinotion is to be applied to these two attributes. L de-
2 Boyer, cursus Ph110soph1ae, II, 376. 
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tailed oomparison of the two attributes will follow their4 indivi-
dual oonsideration, as a prelude to the proof that God is immense 
The fifth ohapter is ohiefly oonoerned with Godts exis-
tenoe in things patterned after the eighth question in the first 
part of the Summa Theologica, but it shall also witness some ex-
planations in the light of the remarks whioh have been made to 
that point in the paper. There are also some further eonsidera-
tions whioh will serve as corollaries of the fourth and fifth 
chapters and which will also be a means of better explaining the 
difference between the two attributes and the necessity of main-
taining ~ensity to be the greater perfection. 
• 
CHAPTER III 
PLACE, SPACE, AND PRESENCE 
The classio definition of plaoel is the one given by 
Aristotle in the fourth book of the Physios.! There he speaks ot 
plaoe as the first, immovable term of a oontaining thing. An ana-
lysis of the terms in this definition will give meaning to it. 3 
It is the term, or boundary, of a oontainer. The plaoe 
1 John of st. Thomas begins his disoussion of plaoe b 
dividing the generio notion of plaoe, sol. that whioh is aoquire 
by looal motion, into extrinsio and intrinsio plaoe. "EXtrinsio 
(place' is that body or surfaoe by whioh the placed thing is oir-
cumsoribed and oontained. Intrinsio plaoe is that passive pre-
senoe of a plaoed thing which is oalled ubi Cthe where2." 
The writer of this thesis has CHOsen to oonsider the 
extrinsic plaoe ot John of st. Thomas as place in the strict 
sense, and to disouss intrinsic plaoe under the notion of pre-
sence. This is done to lessen the danger of oonfusion. rJohn of 
st. Thomas, O. P •• cursus Philosophious Thomistious, ed. P. Bea-
tus Reiser, O. S. B. t Talflnl, lQ35, 335.' 
! Aristotle, Phlsios, Bk. 4, ohap. 6, trans. Thomas 
TaT~or, London, 1806, 202. 
"So that the tirst immovable boundary of that Whioh 
oontains is plaoe." 
This is a desoriptive definition, "for it desoribes in 
what partioular manner plaoe is related to the body whioh is in 
plaoe." tGerard Esser, S. V. D •• cosmologia, Teohny, 1939, 65.] 
3 This explanation may be found in Cooter, A. C. t 
a. J.), Cosmologia, Boston, 1931, 264. 
see also Boyer, cursus Philosophias, It 395-396. 
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of a body in place is the surface of another body by which it is 
imnediately touched and surrounded, and in which it is con-
tained.' A man is said to be in a room when he is surrounded by 
the four walls of that room. If a thing is not contained by ano-
ther body, it is not in place, Just as the en'tire universe, taken 
together, is not in place. since it has no container. 
It is immovable; for a body in place does not ,change 
its place unless the body itself be moved. If place itself were 
movable, a change of place would occur without any motion of the 
thing in place. 5 Boyer answers the difficulty presented in the 
case of a ship anchored in the rapidly flowing waters of a river. 
The place remains the surfaoe of the container, not materially 
understood, but insofar as the container has a fixed relation to 
4 John of st. Thomas, cursus Philosophicus, II, 337. 
"Since a thin:: can be o!roumscrlbed only by reason of 
a surrounding surfaoe. if indeed place must be adeq,uated to the 
thing placed, and since we do not say that man exists in all the 
air, but only in that part in which he is circumscribed, oonse-
quently plaoe must be constituted in the surrounding surface, 
which is oontiguous to the body." 
5 Ibid. 
"It is oertain that plaoe must be absolutely immova-
ble ••• because it is distinguished from a vessel in this that ••• a 
vessel is moved with the thing contained, place however is not 
moved. Plaoe, therefore, as the term both a quo and ad i.1Uem of 
motion is not moved; otherwise if plaoe were moved, it would have 
to move to some plaoe, and thus a plaoe of place would be had, 
and again that other plaoe would have to be moved to another 
place. and thus an infinite prooess would be had." 
These words ot John of st. Thomas are clear enough in 
explaining the ~obility ot plaoe. 
22 
• all the immovable points, which surround the ship. That surface 
of water which is the place of the immovable ship on the river 
is understood in accord with the relations of position and of 
distance to the banks of the river and the river as a whole. 
It is first, or i~~ediate. This is the meaning of 
place in the strictest sense of the term and is had when the 
surfaoe of a body im~ediately surrounds and contains one thing. 
Place. on the other hand, is said to be common, when the surfaoe 
of a body surrounds and contains many thlngs. 6 
The oonsiderations which have just been made as regards 
place are sufficient and complete enough for a proper understan-
ding of the r-.lllltion which God has to place. However, it is ra-
ther important to say a tew words ot the objective validity ot 
the ooncept of place. Experience manifests that some bodies, 
such as air and water, touch and immediately surround other bo-
dies. But place is nothing else but the surface of that body 
which immediately surrounds and contains a thing. Therefore, 
place does exist, and is as real as a body itselt. 7 
Space can be defined as extension conceived as the re-
ceptacle ot a body. suoh a definition of space can certainly be 
6 Dario, J. ;.{.. S. J. t praelectiones cosmologiae» 
paris, 1928, 137. 
7 cotter. oosmologia. 266. 
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• justified, even though it is not commonly offered.8 Dario em-
ploys a somewhat similar definition when he says, "Space is ex-
tension, conceived as penetrable, or as capable of containing 
extended things. n9 The formal conoept of space is not the same 
as the formal concept of corporeal extension, for extension is 
in bodies, whereas bodies are in space; extension is something 
which is as movable as bodies, but space is something in whioh 
bodies move.10 
As regards the validity of the concept of space,ll the 
8 Ibid., 303. 
" ••• it is a faot that almost one hundred different 
opinions are offered on the nature of space ••• " 
9 Dario, praeleotiones, 69. 
10 Ibid. 
11 cotter shows that space is neither a purely sub-jective phenomenon. nor a real being, but a being of reason with 
a foundation in reality. His threefold proof follows: 
"Space would be a purely subJeotive phenomenon, if not 
even an objective foundation for our concept oould be assigned. 
But suoh a foundation oan be assigned, sol. the extension of 
aoAies. which 1s real. Therefore space cannot be called a purely 
subjective phenomenon. 
"Whatever is real either is a SUbstance or an aooident • 
•• But space is neither a sUbstanoe nor an aocident. Therefore 
space is not a real being ••• !f space were a substance, it would 
be a.,body, for it is oonceived as formally extended. BUt wa con-
ceive space as distinot from all bodies and as a receptacle of 
bodies. Theretore spaoe is not a substanoe ••• If space were an 
acoident it would have to inhere in some body. for it is oon-
ceived as formally extended; this body, however, would again be 
in another space--and thus infinitely. But an infinite process 
is repugnant. Therefore space is not an aooident ••• 
"A being ot reason is a non-being conceived as a being. 
But space in itself is nothing ••• it is nonetheless oonceived by 
24 
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words ot Dario are quite clear: Space as such, or formally, is 
only a concept--frequently conjoined with a vague phantasm."l2 
space does not enjoy a real existenoe, but it does have a toun-
dation in the reality of extension. which in the opinion ot 
Dario actually gives birth to the ooncept of space. He even des-
oribes in detail the origin and the toundation of the conoept.l3 
This generic notion ot apace is subject to a fourfold 
division into actual, possible, tmaginary. and absolute space.14 
Aotual spaoe is had where there actually are bodies and three 
dimensions. for although aotual space is not the actual oorpore-
al extension, it nonetheless tollows from it, sinoe it, as it 
were. reoeives the dimensions of the1uantitied object. j.,otual 
space. therefore, is the space which the book occupies on the 
us as a real receptaole. Therefore space is a being of reason ••• 
The extension of bodies 1s something real. But the extension ot 
bodies is the ontologioal foundation of our ooncept of space. 
Therefore our oonoept has a foundation in reality." ccotter t 
cosmologia, 309-3l0.J 
12 Dario, praeleotiones, 70. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Absolute space is implied in imaginary space, but. 
tor reasons of olarity, it reoeives a speoial division. This 
will beoome more apparent further on in this thesis. 'I'his divi-
sion is not to be understood 8S one which is commonly accepted 
by scholastio oosmologists. Just as there are innumerable defi-
nitions oftered ot space, so there are countless divisions. ~t 
would be futile to attempt their numeration. The division whioh 
has been ottered 1s suttioient for the purpose of this thesis. 
Boyer. cursus Philosophiae, I, 400. 
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desk, or the box occupies in the store. Possible space is that 
which is oonceived as arising froni the position of possible bo-
dies; as for example, the space which Pope Pius, the fifteenth, 
could oocupy in Rome. Imaginary space is that which is represen-
ted as existing without existing bodies, as would occur were 
space imagined to exist before the actual existence of a sensi-
ble world, or beyond such a world. Absolute space is infinite ex-
tension conoeived as something existing independently of the 
world and as containing the world. 
One further oonsideratimn remains to be made 85 regards 
the presence of a quantified being. a pure spirit. and an infi-
nite being in place or in space. 
Since place is defined as th6 surface of a body which 
surrounds and contains a thing, it 1s evident that only bodies 
are in place in a proper sense. for only bodies have surfaces. 
Moreover, the surfaoe of a body is said to be extended, since it 
consists of Various parts which both are in contact with the 
parts ot the containing body and oocupy proportionate parts of 
the space in Whioh it exists. Wherefore a body in place is unitea 
by a quantitative contaot with the surfaoe of the surrounding 
body, and it fills the parts of spaoe with its own parts. There-
fore a oontaining body surrounds or airou,llscribes a body in plaoe 
and it is measured by the place in Which it is. For this reason 
bodies are saia to be in plaoe py a circumsoriptive presence. 
26 
• Bodies, therefore. are in place in suoh a way that their parts 
occupy the various parts of a place. 15 Ciroumsoriptive presenoe 
designates the presence of a body in plaos or in spaoe, and that 
presenoe is by parts. This type of presenoe, moreover, is limited~ 
since only one place is in oontact with the dimensions ot a thing 
in place. In other words, if a body is oircumsoriptively present 
in one place, it cannot at the same time be oiroumsoriptively 
present in another place, not even by a divine intervention.16 
It is olear that a spirit, suoh as an angel or the 
htman soul, cannot be in place or in space as a body is, since it 
does not have extended parts. Nevertheless, spirits actually are 
in plaoe. They oocuPY spaoe. The human soul, as an example, is in 
the same plaoe as the body.1? As regards the presenoe of an an-
gel, a pure spirit, in plaoe st. Thomas teaches that it oannot be 
in a body or in a place exoept by its operation which wouldbrin.B 
about some effect in the body.18 He becomes more specifio when 
15 "That which by its very own dimensions is oommensu-
rate with the dimensions of a place is in place circumsoriptivelJ 
or essentially." tIbid., 406.J 
16 Peter Hoenen, S. J •• Annotationes cosmologias, Rome, 
1930. 114. Here the author proves his thesis: "It seems that it is 
absolutely repugnant for the same body to be oircumsoriptively 
present in many places.~ 
l? cotter, cosmologia, 268. 
18 st. Thomas Aquinas, scriptum super Libros sententi-
arum, Lib. It dist. XXXVII, q. 3, a. 1, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, 0, 
p., paris, 1929, 871. 
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he says that as a body 1s in plaoe by the oontaot of qUantified 
dimensions, so an angel is in plaoe by the oontact of its po-
wer.19 Sinoe spir'its do not ha.ve extended parts but ex.ist rather 
in their simple essenoe, they are present in their entire essenoe 
in eaoh part of the plaoe whioh they oocupy. The entire spirit is 
actually present in some plaoe and the entire spirit is entirely 
present &n eaoh partioular part of that plaoe, Just as the human 
soul is entirely present in the body and is entirely present in 
eaoh individual part of the body.20 The claim is not made that 
these spiritual beings are present in place by some quantified 
contact, but rather that they exercise their aotivity in place 
either as formal oauses, as the h~~an soul. or as efficient oau-
ses, suoh as the angels. '.rhis is the reason why at. Thomas main-
tains that they are present, not by a quantified oontaot, but 
rather by the oontaot of their power, but nonetheless they are 
still substantially present, since their power is but a manifes-
tation of their presenoe; not the presenoe itself. Definitive 
presenoe, therefore, desoribes the presenoe of the human soul and 
ot a pure spirit in ~lace or in space. It 1s a limited presenoe, 
19 S. T., I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1, Basio'#r1tings, ed. 
pegis, I~ 65. 
20 "That whioh is not oommensurate with the dimensions 
of the plaoe in which it is, and is only in this determined plaoe 
and not everywhere, is definitively in plaoe." (Boyer. Cursus 
PhilosoEhiae~ I, 406., 
r 
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since they oan be present in only one deter~ined place and not 
everywhere. A human soul, for example, is present only within 
the body of this particular person. This sume individual soul 
cannot be in many men. 
There is, however, a third type of presence which is 
peculiar to God alone. Just as God Himself is an unquantified 
Being, He cannot enjoy the sarne type of presence as a body does. 
Nor can His presence be the same as that of the huian soul or of 
a pure spirit, such as an angel, since their presence is limited. 
His presence cannot be circumscribed, ,nor can it be defined to 
anyone place. AS in the case of spirits, the reason for His 
presencb is the power which He exercises upon His subjects. 21 
It is sufficient merely to state this fact here, since a more 
exhaustive treatment will be offered when, in the fifth chapter, 
a discussion of the opinion of st. Thomas as regards God's spe-
cial mode of presence is presented. Repletive presence, there-
fore, designates that special presence of God in place, a pre-
sence which is proper to Him alone. God is entirely present in 
all space. just as He is entirely present in each particular part 
of that spaae. 22 His presence is unlimited, just as His perfec-
21 S. T. t I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1, Jnsic xritings, ed. 
pegis, I, 65. 
22 "God is eVerywhere eminently, neither circumscribed 
nor defined." CBoyer, Cursus Philosophiee, It 406.) 
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tions are unlimited and infinite. 
Although His presence can be truly said to be unlimi-
ted. since He actually is everywhere, it is likewise true that 
the number of in4i vidual created plaoes, when added tOfJ;ether. are 
still of a finite number. Although His presence is not limited 
to anyone or the other of places, still He oan only be present 
where there aotually are plaoes and spaoe whioh He oan ocouPY. 
But these are of a finite number, and henoe it would seem that 
His presenoe is limited. This difficulty is to be considered in 
the chapter which immediately follows. 
r ~-----------------------------------------------------, 
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GOOtS RELATION '10 PLACE AND SPACE 
Although there are many different ways of olassifying 
ahd distinguishing the divine attributes,l there is one special 
division which can clearly embrace all the attributes. This di-
vision will serve as an invaluable aid in clarifying the distinc-
tion between the omnipresence and the i.~ensity of God. 2 EVery 
attribute ot God is either an absolute or a relative one. It is 
absolute when it can be predicated of God independently of the 
existence of the world. This type of attribute refers to the Di-
vine Substance in Itself, or to the Divine operation when it re-
gards the Divine Nature alone, independently of a relation to 
creatures. Thus, regardless of the existence of a created uni-
verse, God would still be one, simple, ~utable, eternal, and 
immense. He would still be endowed with an intellect and a will, 
since their proper object is God Himself. An attribute is said 
to be relative when it indicates some relation, though not a 
real one, between creatures and the Godhead. It is an attribute 
1 Garrigou-Lagrange, The one God, 164-170. 
2 This division is the same as the one offered by 
Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 376. 
3~ 
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which depends upon the actual existence of a oreated universe. In 
other words those s»tributes are suid to be relative attributes 
it they refer to Godts virtually transient operations, such as 
His creation, conservation, and concurrenoe. The divine knowledge 
and the divine will likewise can be oonsidered as relative per-
feotions, when these two faoulties are conoerned with their secon 
dary objeots. Every attribute, theretore, whioh of its very na-
ture involves the existenoe of finite, oontingent, and created 
being is a relative attribute. 
Omnipresenoe is a divine attribute whereby God is ao-
tually present in all actual space. This mode of presence is 
different than that enjoyed by any tinite being, whether it be a 
body, the human soul, or a pure spirit, tor God is in all things 
as aD agent is present to that which it aots upon. st. Thomas 
bases his proof for the omnipresenoe ot God upon the very taot 
that God is EXistenoe Itself. 3 Since He is so, oreated existenoe 
must be His proper effect. BUt ae oauses this effeot in creatures 
not only as regards beginnings in existence, but as lon~~ as they 
are preserved in existenoe.' Hencs, as long as a thing has exis-
tenoet God must be present to it. And Just as He is the oause of 
3 S. T., It q. 8, a. 1, Basic writings, ad. Fegis, I, 
4 " ••• God oauses this effect in things not only when 
they tirst begin to be. but as long as they are preserved in be-
ing ••• " C.Ibid .• l 
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• the existenoe and the oonservation in existenoe of all things, H 
must be in all thin;s, and henoe everywhere. 5 
In the fifth ohapter of this thesis a more thorough 
disoussion of the teaching ot st. Thomas will be offered. For th 
present it is SUfficient merely to understand what is meant by 
divine omnipresenoe. It is an attribute which regards God's ao-
tual presence in aotually existing things. It implies nothing 
more. sinoe He can only be aotually present where there is aotua 
space. 
Immensity, on the other hand, is a divine attribute 
whereby God is actually present in all actual spaoe as soon as i 
begins to exist. without any ohange ocourinf:j to Him. 6 There are 
three elements in this definition of immensity which should be 
explained. Existence in aotual space is a perfection, and henoe 
God. as the Infinite Being, must possess it. Otherwise, He would 
be limited and imperfeot. Moreover, He must be present in all ac 
tual spaoe, for this is a greater perfection, and were He not to 
possess it, He would be to that extent limited. It is evident 
from His immutability that no change can be predicated ot Him. 
5 Ibid. 
6 " ••• The immensity of God is understood as a propert 
by which God can in no place be either oiroumsoribed or defined, 
so that no matter how often plaoes and spaoes are multiplied, not 
only will God be in them, but He will remain oapable of being in 
all others without end." tBoyer, cursus Philosophiae. II, 382.J 
33 
• It has already been said that the mode of presenoe of 
a finite being is measured by the space it oooupies or in whioh 
it exercises its aotivities. Ciroumsoriptive presence and defini-
tive presenoe are, in a word, limited perfections. Moreover, it 
is evident that God is present in all things whioh are by virtue 
ot His omnipresenoe. 7 However, His mode of presence must surpass 
all space, so that His presenoe is not misunderstood as measured 
or limited by the finite space in which that presenoe is. Immen-
sity, as an absolute attribute ot God, is not dependent upon the 
existenoe of 8 finite, oreated universe, and hence it does not 
limit God's presence to that universe. Although God is aotually 
present in all aotual space whioh does exist, He nonetheless 
possesses, as it were, an overtlowing ot perfeotion which demands 
that He be actu~lly present to all spaoe as soon as it beoomes 
aotual, so that were He to oreate another universe, 8svast and 
as oomplex as this one, His divine immensity would demand that 
He be aotually present therein, possessins, however, the selt-
same overflowing of Intinite Perteotion. 
Independently ot the existenoe or the non-existenoe of 
the oreated universe, God is ~ense. Only on the oondition that 
7 "God is ••• entirely in all plaoes, not by soraps and 
fragments of His essence ••• there 1s no spaoe, not th t 
wherein God is not wholly aooording to His essen ,ateDl~ 
Charnock, Disoourses upon the~istenoe and th ~ ributesdt~~ 
God, London. 1842, 238.] LOYDI ,~ 
~ ~------------------------------------------------------------, 
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this universe does exist does God enjoy omnipres,enoe. Immensity, 
therefore, is an absolute attribute of God. Omnipresence, on the 
other hand, is a relative one. 
The proof for the immensity of God depends upon the 
fact that God is Infinite.8 BUt repletive presence in space or 
in place is an absolutely pure perfection, which positively ex-
cludes all imperfection. Therefore God 18 repletively present. 
But repletive presence ~plies immensity, and hence God is im-
mense. If the argument is to have any rorce, it must be shown 
that replet1ve presence is an absolutely pure perfection and that 
it implies immensity. 
AS regards the former assertion, it is readily admitted 
that the presence of anything in space or in place is a perfeo-
tion, since it 1s better to have than not to have. Raplstive 
preseno., however, means that all the imperfeotions which are 
implied in the presence of a creature are removed. These imper-
8 The exaot wording of the proof offered by Boyer is 
the following: 
-That which is so related to all places whatsoever 
that it 1s neither ciroumsoribed nor defined by them is i~~ense. 
But God in no way can be oiroumsoribed or defined. Therefore He 
is immense. The minor is proved. What is oiroumscribed in place 
has parts whioh are co~ensurate to the parts of the place. But 
God is simple. Therefore He is not oiroumscribed in place. Fi-
nally. what is defined in plaoe does not have the power by whioh 
it may at the same time oooupy another plaoe. But God is of in-
finite power. Therefore Be is not defined in any plaoe.~ tBoyer, 
cursus Philosophiae, II. 383-384.) 
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tections are twofold. In oircmnscriptive presence it consists 
in the tact that a body is present quantitatively or by parts. 
In both ciroumscriptive and detinitive presenoe it consists in 
the tact that the presenoe is restricted to some determined 
space. Repletive presence. theretore. is a perfection Which in-
volves no imperteotion. Moreover. it positively excludes all im-
pertection. It is therefore an absolutely pure perfection. 
Divine immensity has been defined as that attribute 
whereby God is actually present in all actual space, as soon as 
it begins to exist, without any change oocuring to Him. If, howe-
ver.,the divine nature were not to demand that He be immediately 
present in all new aotual spaoe without any change, His presence 
would not be repletive, since it would be in a very real manner 
limited to the space in which He ls. Henoe repletive presence 
~plies immensity. And the conclusion that God is immense is a 
valid one. 
CHAPTER V 
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS 
ACCORDING TO ST. THOYtAS 
• 
From what has been said ot the omnipresence and the 
immensity ot God to this point, it is olear that both ot these 
attributes stem trom the tact that God is Existence Itselt, or 
an Intinite Being. st. Thomas was so well aware of this fact that 
imnlediately atter ~is discussion of the Intinity ot God in the 
Summa Theologica. he considers the existenoe ot God in thlngs.1 
It is profitable to study in de.ail the tour artioles whioh oom-
prise this question, tor Thomas considers the aotual presenoe ot 
God in things as well as the mode of that presenoe. He oonsiders, 
likewise the reasons why God is everywhere, and shows, finally, 
that His mode ot presence is a most unique one. 
In the first ot these artioles entitled, "Whether God 
is in all things," the positive teaching ot st. Thomas is that 
God is in all things in a most intimate manner, namely, as an 
agent is present to that upon which it acts. Every aBent must be 
1 S. T •• It q. 8, a. 1-4, Basic writings, ed. pegis. 
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• joined to that upon whioh it acts im.:l1ediately, either by some 
virtual oontaot or by quantitative contact. 2 An inoorporeal 
agent cannot, however. exeroise any quantitative oontact. And 
henoe the oontaot whioh God exeroises. as the oause of the produo 
t10n and the conservation of all things in existenoe is a virtual 
oontaot which cannot be re8l1y distinot from His essence. 3 
st. Thomas thus shows that God i8 innermost in all 
things sinoe He 1s the oause of their very existenoe. whioh is 
more inherent 1n a thing than the very form of a ShinS, sinoe 
existenoe is the ultimate aotuality of every torm.' However, he 
does not prove 1n this art1cle that God 1s the oonservative and 
immediate oause or the existenoe of all things. Suoh a proof 1s 
forthooming later on, when he writes, "AS the beooming or a thing 
oannot oontinue when the aotion of the agent, whioh oauses the 
beooming of the efrect, oeases, 80 neither can the existenoe ot 
2 commentary of cardinal Cajetan. O. Fe, S. T •• It i' 8. a. 1, Opera Omnia Thoma. Aquinatls. Leonine Edition, Rome, 
888, IV, 85. 
"Therefore He is in all things ••• beoause every agent 
must be joined th that upon which it immediately aota." 
3 "God is Existenoe Itself through His essenoe; there-
fore He has oreated existenoe for His proper erteot, not only in 
beooming, but also in conservation." Clbid.l 
4 "EXistence is formal with respeot to all thlnes 
whioh exist in reality; therefore it is profoundlu in all things; 
therefore it is intimate to eaoh thing. Therefpre God, the pro-
per agent or existenoe, is intimately in all things."CIbid.l 
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a thing oontinue after the action of the agent, whioh is the 
oause of the effect, not only in beooming but also in existence, 
has ceased. ft5 If, then, God is the proper oause of all created 
being, then the being of things oannot continue in existenoe 
without Godts preservative aotion. In the body of the artiole, 
however, Thomas shows that oreated existenoe is the proper effeot 
of God, Who is a Being by His very essenoe, just as to ignite is 
the proper effeot of fire. Thus God both brings things into exis-
tenoe and preserves them in ex1stence. 
The conolusion therefore whioh Thomas makes is that as 
long as a thing has existenoe. God must be actually present to 
it. and sinoe existenoe is the :.!lost ultimate aotua1i ty of every 
form, God must be present in all things and innermostly. 
It is perhaps in answer to the seoond objeotion that 
st. Thomas gives a slightly different slant to what he has said 
in the body of the artiole. The seoond objeotion maintained that 
God rather oontains thin?s than is oontained by them. His res-
ponse points out that oorporea1 things are said to be in the 
thing whioh oontains them, but spiritual things rather contain 
the things in whioh they are, as the soul oontains the body. 
God. likewise, is in u11 things as containing them. not, howe-
ver, as a form determining the matter, but rather as a causa 
5 S. T. , It q. 104, a. 1, Basic Writings, ad. pegis, 
J 
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oonserving the effeot. 6 • 
In the second article St. Thomas conoerns himself with 
the question as to whether God is everywhere. The purpose of this 
q~estion is to determine whether God is in all things as well as 
in all plaoes, insotar as they are plaoes. The diffioulty narrows 
itself down to this: it seems as though God oannot be said to be 
in plaoe, tor inoorporeal things are not in plaoe. st. Thomas 
answers this objeotion ot Boethiu8 by asserting, as he did in the 
first article, that inoorporeal things oan be said to be in plaoe 
by their virtual oontact. 
In the body ot the article a twofold answer is given by 
Thomas. He is oareful to warn that God 1s not present in place as 
oorporeal things fill a plaoe to the exolusion of other bodies. 
He is in things as giving them their very existenoe. He is, more-
over, in the real place itself, in the same manner as He is in 
the thing plaoed, insofar as He gives existence even to the sur-
faoe of the surrounding body. Hence God is in all things and in 
avery place.8 He is, briefly. everywhere. 
6 Garrigou-Lagrange, The one God, 257. 
7 God is eVerywhere, because He 1s in all things, sus-
taining them in being; and because, while bodies fill space, God 
too tills apace, sinoe He tills all the world." CA. G. Rebert, 
studies in st. Thomas. London, 1938, 48.) 
a commentary of cajetan. S. T., I. q. a, a. 3, Leonine 
Edition, IV, 86. 
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• In the third article, nWhether God is everywhere by Hi 
essence, presence, and power," st. Thomas distinguishes between 
God's speoial mode of presenoe in the just and His general mode 
of presenoe in all things as an agent, or as an effioient oause. 
He is espeoiAlly in the rational creatures who know and love Him 
habitually, and most especially in the saints by graoe. 9 The ar 
ticle likewise concerns itself with the threefold manner in whio 
God, the efficient cause of all things, i. in all things. He is 
there by His power, insofar as all things are subject to that 
power. He is there by His presence, insofar as all things are 
known to HLm and are the immediate obJeots ot His providence, 
and He is there by His essence, insofar as He is the cause of 
the existence of all things.10 
In the reply to the fourth article, "Whether to be 
everywhere belongs to God alone," st. Thomas asserts that to be 
everywhere primarily and essentially belongs to God alone, for 
only God, atter creation. is necessarily and immediately in His 
whole selt, undividedly, in all things and places, for He main~ 
9 "God 1s in something in a twofold manner: sol. ef-
fectively and objeotively ••• the former is general, the latter, 
speoial." tIbid., SS.l 
10 "The general mode ••• is distinguished into existeno 
in things by His essenoe, presence, and power." Ibid. 
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tains all things in existenoe. What is primarily or imme~iately 
everywhere must belong to a thing in its entire selt, and not 
aooording to its parts. and henoe, although the whole world can 
be said to be everywhere, it is not primarily or immediately 
everywhere, but it is there acoording to its different parts. 
Moreover. what is essentially or necessarily everywhere 1s so. 
when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere. And hence, on 
the supposition that no other body existed, a grain of sand 
would be everywhere, not essentially or necessarily, but only 
hypothetioally.1l Therefore, "to be everywhere primarily and 
essentially belongs to GOd, and is proper to Him; because what-
ever number of plaoes be supposed to exist. OOd must be in all 
of them, not by a part of Him, but by His very self.,,12 
In this article st. 'l'homas bases his ohief proof of 
the faot that God is omnipresent upon the fact that God, the ef-
fioient cause of the beginning and the conservation in existence 
of all places and things, is inherently present in things by a 
virtual oontact. This contact 1s opposed to theoontaot of di-
mensive quantity by which bodies are in plaoe. The human soul 
and pure spirits, as has been said above, oannot be in plaoe in 
11 aarrigou-Lagrange. The One God, 262-263. 
12 S. T., I, q. a. a. 4, Basio writings, ed. pegis, 
I, 69. 
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the same manner as bodies are, since they are 1ncorporeat. Their 
presence, just as the presence of God, must be descr1bed in term 
of the power which they exercise in the plaoe in whioh they exis • 
The human soul, therefore, has its presenoe restr1cted to the 
body whioh it animates and vivifies. AS regards the presence of 
a pure spirit,l! St. Thomas indioates the var10us p01nts of d1f-
ferenoe between an angel's presenoe and the d1v1ne omnipresence: 
An angel's power and nature ar,.; fin1te, whereas the 
d1v1ne power and essenoe, wh10h is the un1versal 
oause ot all th1ngs, 1s 1nf1nite. Consequently 
through H1s power God touohes all things, and Is not 
present merely in some plaoes, but eVtJrywhere. Now 
since the angel's power is finite, 1t does not ex-
tend to all things. but to one determined thing. For 
whatever is oompared with one power must be compared 
wi th it as one determined thing. Conse:1uently. since 
all beine is compared as one thing to God's univer-
sal power, so one particular being is compared as 
something one to the angelio power. Henoe, since the 
angel is in a place by the applioation of his power 
to the plaoe, it follOWS that he is not every~here, 
nor in several plaoes, but in only one plaoe.~4 
The oonsiderations whioh have been oftered in this 
13 commentary ot cajetan, S. T. t I, q. 52, a. 2, Leo-
nine Edition, V, 25-26. 
"An angel is not everywhere, but in one particular 
plaoe ••• He is not everYWhere, from the 4ifterence between the 
power of an angel and the divine power: since the former is 
finite, the latter infinite; the former is a particular cause, 
the latter is the universal cause of all things ••• An angel can 
have only one particular etfect; therefore he can be in only 
one partioular place ••• And Just as universal being is related 
to God's universal power, so some particular being i8 related 
to the power of an angel." 
14 S. ,T., 1, q. 52, a, 2, Basio Writings, ed. pegis, 
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• chapter are, at the very least, indicative of the fact that st. 
Thomas ranked the omnipresence of God as one of His more impor-
tant attributes. He does not formally discuss the immensity of 
God, but nonetheless it is important to keep in mind the distinc-
tion which already has been made betWeen the two attributes. The 
relative attribute of omnipresence is that attribute whereby God 
is actually present in all actual space. The absolute attribute 
ot ~~ensity is that attribute whereby God is actually present 
in all actual space. as soon as it begins' to exist, without any 
change occuring to Him. Briefly, then, omnipresenoe refers to 
God's actual presence in all things, and iUUlensity refers to His 
aptitude to exist in them. 
CHAPTER VI 
SOME COROLLARIES 
The ola~s which the divine attributes of omnipresence 
and immensity make on God's speoial mode ot presenoe in the worl 
are not to be oontused with the olaims of pantheism. It is hard-
ly neoessary to study here the oountless forma ot Pantheism whioh 
have been introdueed down the ages to a truth-searohing people. 
tor no matter how many torms are proposed, Pantheism always 
stresses Godts immanenoe in the universe with an utter disregard 
for His transoendenoe. l 
Pantheism may be detined as any explanation ot the uni-
verse whioh, although admitiing the existenoe ot God. identifies 
His reality with that ot the universe. 2 Suoh an identifioation 
i8 made to explain the unity ot all reallty--a unity which is 
preser.ed intaot without any separation from the souroe of that 
unity. A Pantheistio philosophy seeks this unity in maintaining 
that there is but one essence .or all things. It oompletely ig-
1 "In whatever way it is expressed, pantheism always 
maintains that God is immanent in the universe but does not tran-
soend it." CMcCormiok, Natural Theology, l85.J 
2 Ibid. 
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.. 
nores the contribution of st. Thomas whioh safeguards and de-
fends the unity of the multiple by reason of the relation of the 
multiple to the One Cause. 3 
It is suffioiently olear that God is immanent in the 
uni verse as the orL'lnating and conserving Cause of the universe. 
sinoe there is no being in existence to whioh God is not inti-
mately present. oontaoting it by His power and keeping it in 
existenoe. The omnipresenoe and the im.."Uensity of God certainly 
attest to this faot. But it is this very truth whioh is distor-
ted by pantheism. 4 AS the Cause of the universe, God oannot be 
identified with the universe. so that. althou~h He is im.:nanent 
in the universe, His reality must be really distinct from it, 
"sinoe God is neither the material oause nor the formal oause of 
the world, nor its neoessary and effioient oause, but its ab-
solutely transoendent and tree efficient oause."5 
3 Ibid., 169. 
4: some of the other truths whioh are distorted by Pan-
theism are the following: "There is nothing that is not, as to 
the:whole ot its being, caused by God. There is nothing that is 
not preserved by God, for the being of things is the proper ef-
fect of God ••• God operates in every agent. not to dispense the 
oreature from aoting, as the ocoas10nalists think. but to apply 
it to aotion. God moves the created intellect and immediately 
moves the oreated will, but He does no violen •• to it ••• " CGar-
rigou-~~granget The One God, 203.) 
£) Ibid., 204. 
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.. Therefore, although God is intimately present in all 
things as the effioient cause of their beginning to exist and 
of their conservation in existence, His reality is not identi-
fied with the reality which is theirs. It is hardly necessary. 
nor is it oonsidered fitting, to delve into the countless argu-
ments which have been offered against Pantheism. It is sutficien 
merely to have indioated the 4ifterenoe between the olaims of 
Godts speoial mode of presence and the olaims of pantheism. In a 
word, then, Pantheism stresses God's immanenoe in reality, fai-
ling to oonsider His transoendenoe, whereas, Theism olearly main 
talns His immanenoe as well a8 Hls transoendence.' 
From what has already been sald of the presence of a 
thing ln plaoe or in spaoe, it ls olear that nothing could be 
actually present unless aotual spaoe exists. Aotual spaoe exists 
only where there actually are bodies and three dimensions, sinoe 
lt receives, as it were, the actual dimensions of the quantified 
Object.? An actually existing quantified object is said to be 
ln actual space beoause its dimensions till the space in whioh 
it is. Hence, if no actual space were to exist, it would tollow 
that nothing could be aotually present, for just as the exis ... 
6 "AS a oause ••• He has His reality distinct from the 
reality of the universe. His rea.lity is immanent in the universe, 
but also transoends it." [Mccormiok, Natural Theology, 186.' 
7 see Chapter III 
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.. tenoe ot aotual spaoe depends upon the existenoe of aotual and 
quantified beings, so too does the aotual presenoe of an exten-
ded being depend upon the existenoe of aotual spaoe. 
Do the same oonsiderations hold true for the presence 
of an un~uantitied being in space? In other words. does the aotu 
al presenoe of the human soul, a pure spirit, and God Himself 
likewise depend upon the existenoe of aotual spaoe? It _7 be re 
oalled that an inoorporeal being can be truly said to be in 
space" not by any quantitative oontact, but rather by a virtual 
contaot. insofar as that being exercises its power upon a cor-
poreal obJect~8 It has likewise been pointed out that the power 
whioh the human soul or a pure spirit exeroises upon a quanti-
fied objeot i8 a limited power. so that its presenoe at anyone 
time is limited to one determined oorporeal objeot. Were aotual 
spaoe, therefore, not to exist, a quantified obJeot could not be 
aotually present, and neither the human soul nor a pure spirit 
could enjoy aotual presenoe. 
A similar oonsideration holds true in the case of the 
divine presenoe. His presenoe in a thing is, in a word, through 
the power which He exeroises upon that thing, and sinoe His po-
wer is infinite, so too He must be in all things"as the oause 
of their existenoe and their oonservation in existenoe. However. 
8 S. 1' .. I, q. 8, a. 2. ad 1, Basio :.'ir1t~ngst ed. 
pegis t I'tL 65. 
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if actual s1>ace were not to exist, there would be no quantified 
objects in which God could exercise His inrini te powl,;r. and so 
He Himself could not enjoy actual presence without the actual 
presence 01' -luanti1'ied objects in actual space. 
Before the creation at the world only God existed. 
There was nothing other than G9d in which He could exercise riis 
infinite power. AS an Infinite Beins, furtherm.ost removed from 
corporeity, He, the only exist1ng Being, possessed no actual pre-
sence. It is true that He was in Himself, but, having no other 
being in which to exist, He was nowhere. Since actual presence 
demands the existenoe of actual spaoe, and since the existence 
of actual sp"aoe depends upon the existence of cluantified beine, 
which did not exist before the oreation of the world, God was 
nowhere. Betore the creation of the world, the world was poss'blJ 
existent. The spaoe whioh it here and now does oocuPY. and whioh 
now is actual space, ,was then only possible space. And although 
it may be truly said that God was present in that possible space, 
He was only potentially there, since actual presence can only be 
had where there is actuel space. A being oan be said to be only 
potentielly present, however, in potential space. God, there-
fore J potentially present in potential space 'Nhich was the world 
before its creation, could not enjoy actual presenoe. 
Now just as God was nowhere before the creation ot the 
world. He did not then possess the attribute of omnipresence, fOI 
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there was no plaoe tor Him to be. This is why divine omnipresence 
is oalled a relative attribute. For. although the divine nature 
de::nands thbt God be aotually present in all aotual spaoe. neVer-
theless suoh an attribute depends upon the actual existence at 
the world. Even betore the oreation of the world, however, God 
was truly immense. lie possessed then, as He does now, that apti-
tude, or capacity, of being aotually present 1n all actual spaoe. 
as soon as it begins to exist, without any change ocouring to 
Him. Independently of the existenoe or the non-existence of the 
world, therefore. God is immense. This is the reason why immensitl 
is referred to as an absolute attribute of God. 
Absolute spaoe is defined as infinite extension con-
oeived as something existing independently of the world and as 
oontaining the world. It is readily admitted that this notion ot 
absolute spaoe is rather confusing. There is no reality, nor any 
foundation in reality, for the notion of absilute spaoe. 9 Aotual 
space, as was said above, oould not exist were there not extended 
objeots, beoause aotual spaoe consists in the aotual dim.ensions 
ot a quantified objeot. Independently of the world, there is no 
suoh thing as aotual spaoe, for it is only in the oreated uni-
9 Aotually, as has been said in the third chapter, ab-
solute spaoe is simply imaginary space, which "is a being of rea-
son oonoeived after the manner of being, although it oannot exist~ 
[Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, I. 400.) 
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• verse that quantified being is found. Outside the universe. there 
fore. there is no aotual spaoe, nor any aotuallY extended objects 
in whioh God exeroises His infinite power. If one were to main-
tain that God were 60tually present in absolute spaoe, he would 
likewise have to maintain that God is aotually present nowhere, 
for there is no possibility of actual ,resenoe where there is no 
aotual spaoe. 
Beyond the world, or beyond t~e oreated universe whioh 
is the world, no aotual presenoe is possible.10 For just as 
there are no quantified objeots outside the world, so it is that 
no aotual presenoe is possible. And since nothinG oan be actually 
present where there is no aotual spuoe. so God, Who is nonethe-
less omnipresent and immense, oannot be actually present beyond 
the world, where actual spaoe is not had. 
10 Charnook shows, at length, that "God is present 
beyond the world.~ His reason is that "if God were only confined 
to the world, Be would be no more infinite in His essence than 
the world is in quantity. As a non-Soholastio, his language will 
have a shade of differenoe in meaning than the traditionally 
soholastio notion of presenoe. Furthermore, he seems to be oar-
ried away with the neoessity of stre8sin~ the fact that God's 
presence is unlimited. CCharnook. Disoourses, 239.1 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The threefold distinotion of the presenoe of a thing 
in plaoe or in spaoe is readily seen to be a valid one, if the 
various types of existing being be oonsidered. Ciroumsoriptive 
presence indioat$s the presenoe of a body in spaoe or in plaoe. 
Sinoe this presenoe is by quantitative parts, it is a limited 
perfeotion, and henoe oannot be predioated ot the supremely In-
tinite Being. Definitive presenoe designates the presenoe of the 
human soul or a pure spirit in plaoe or in spaoe. Although this 
presence is not by q,uantitative parts, it nonetheless is a limi-
ted perfection, insofar as their presenoe, at anyone time, is 
restricted to one in4i vidual body upon whioh they exeroise .. their 
power. They are entirely present in eaoh part of the body and en-
tirely present in eaoh part ot that spaoe whioh the body ooou-
pies. Their presenoe, likewise, is limited. Repletive presenoe, 
on the other hand, oharaoterizes the existenoe of God in space or 
in plaoe. It is a most unique presenoe, since the twofold limita-
tion of oiroumsoriptive and definitive preLenoe is raInoved. God 
is entirely present in all actual space, and He is entirely pre-
sent in eaoh individual portion of all aotual spaoe. 
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BUt even though this twofold limitation is not aharac-
teristic of God's actual presence, it nevertheless seems as 
though there is a limit to Godts presence, since He oan only be 
actually present where there is actual space, and actual space is 
had only where there actually are bodies and three dimensions. 
But only in this created, finite, and contin:;:en.t universe do 1:>0-
dies enjoy actual existence. Hence, it seems as though His actual 
presence is limited, not by reason of Himself, but rather by rea-
son ot the finiteness of the universe. This is the reason why a 
distinction is made between the relative attribute of omnipre~ 
sence and the absolute attribute ot immensity. 
Repleti~e presence not only removes the twotold limita-
tion 01' circumscriptive and definitive presence, but it likewise 
jremoves the danr,er of the apparent limitation contained in the 
Illotion of omnipresence, since repletive presence implies the ab-
solute attribute of immensity. Not only is God everywhere, as His 
omnipresenoe implies, but the repletive presence whioh He enjoys 
positively exoludes all limitation and imperfeotion, whioh may be 
suggested by His being omnipresent .. Were the Divine dubstance not 
to demand that God be aotually present in all aotual spaoe, as 
soon as that spaoe begins to exist, without any ohange whatsoever 
ooouring in Him, the presenoe of the divinity would indeed be li-
mited. 
From the considerations which have been made in this 
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• thesis, one great oonolusion stands out. Although it is true that 
God is everywhere, His omnipresenoe is a relative attribute, 
whioh depends upon the actual existenoe of the universe, whereas 
His immensity, as an absolute attribute of the Godhead, does not 
need the aotual existenoe of the universe to jUstify its predi-
oation of the Godhead. AS such, immensity is the greater of the 
two perfections. 
In conolusion. it is oonsidered fitting to quote the 
opening lines ot Robert Montgomery's olassic poem, entitled The 
-
omnipresenoe of the Deity:l 
Thou Unoreate, Unseen, and Undefined 
source of all life, and fountain of the mind; 
pervading spirit, Whom no eye can trace, 
Felt through all time, and working in all apace, 
Imagination cannot paint that spot 
Around, above, beneath, where Thou art nott 
1 Robert Montgomery, The omnipresenoe of the Deity, 
London. 1841, 29. 
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APPENDIX I 
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE FIVg TH0:USTIC A.B.GUMENTS 
FOR THE EIISTENCE OF GOD 
The tirst argument whioh st. Thomas offers tor the exis-
~enoe ot God is taken tram the oonoept of motion. His olassio ar-
gument may be s~~ed up in the following form. l Something in the 
world is moved. But everything whioh is moved is moved by another. 
rherefore that something in the world which is moved is moved by 
another. But this mover either here and now is moved, or it is 
!lot. If it is not moved. then an Immovable Mover is had, and the 
thesis stands. It it is moved, the seoond mover, either here and 
!lOW is moved, or it is not. If it is not moved, then an %mmovable 
~over is had and the thesis stands. It it is moved, the same con-
siderations must again be made. But it is impossible to pro.eed 
nfinitely in such a series ot essentially subordinated movers. 2 
~heretore there exists an Immovable Mover, Who is God. 
1 For the exaot wording of all theae proofs, see s. T., 
~J q. 2, a. 3, Basic writings. edt pegis, I. 22-23. 
2 ",ve are not oonoerned with past moyers 8.S in the 
~eries ot generations either of animals or of men; for these mo-
vers are accidentally and not essentially subordinated, ,and their 
~nrluenoe has oeased.·' CGarrigou-Lagrange t The one God, l40.J 
56 
57 
• There are, however, two assertions in this proof whioh 
must be validated. First of all,,88 regards the first minor. 801. 
that everything which is moved is moved by another, st. Thomas 
ofters this proof. The same thing cannot at once be in potenoy 
and act as regards the same perteotion. But what 1s moved is in 
potency and what moves is in act. Therefore the same thing cannot 
at the same time move and be moved as regards the same perfec-
tion. Therefore nothing can move itself. ~herefore everything 
Which is moved is moved by another. 
There is a further assertion in the principal part of 
this Thomistic proof which must be olarified, and that is that it 
is impossible to proceed infinitely in a series of essentially 
~ subordinated movers. In suoh a series of movers all the movers 
would be instrumental. But if there were not a prinoipal mover, 
the possibility of any instrumental mover would be taken away. 
and as a oonsequent the possibility ot any motion would be de-
stroyed. Therefore an intinite regress of essentiolly subordina-
ted movers is impossible. st. Thomas is here oonoerned with es-
sentially subordinated movers. He claims that it is not impossi-
ble for man to be generated to infinity, but in suoh a oase the 
sufficient reason for the motion of each being could not be toun~ 
within this infinite series. The suffioient reason tor their mo-
tion must be looked tor without the series of aooidentally subor-
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dinated movers. 3 • 
The oonolusion of st. Thomas is that it is neoessary 
to arrive ar a First Mover. set in motion by no other, and this 
everyone understands to be God. The First Mover is immobile, 
"not with the immobility of inertia or of passive potenoy, whioh 
implies imperfeotion and is inferior to motion, but with the im-
mobility of aotuality, who does not need to be premoved so as to 
aot. ft4 
An almost identioal prooedure as in the proof from mo-
tion is round in the seoond Thomistic argument tor Godts exis-
tence. In this argu~ent st. Thomas considers the empirioal fact 
, 
that an order of effioient causes exists in the world. Two prin-
oiples are applied to this tact whioh lead to the conclusion of 
the existenoe of a First Cause, Who is unoaused. and to Whom 
everyone gives the name of God. 
The first of these principles whioh st. Thomas intro-
duoes in the minor of the argument is that nothing oan be the 
oause ot itself. It a thing were the cause of itself, it would 
be prior to itself, which is impossible. Such a proposition, 
then, involves a contradiotion, sinoe the thing would be both 
existing and non-existing at the same time, tor from the very 
3 "If this series is eternal, it 1s an eternally in-
suffioient explanation of motion, and is not its own reason for 
this." tIbid., l4l.~ 
4 Ibid. 
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notion of oausality, a thing oan be oaused only insofar as it 
does not exist, and it oan oause only insofar as it does exist. 5 
The second prinoiple introduced by Thomas is that it 
is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes. It is 
evident that st. Thomas speaks of the order of essentially subor-
dinated oauses beoause of the very wording of this seoond prin-
.iple. Were he speaking of aooidentally subordinated oauses, his 
assertion would be invalid.' As a proof ot this prinoiple, st. 
5 There is a need for some explanation of the distino-
[tion whioh is made between the cause in fieri and the cause in 
esse. For this explanation, the followIng citation is made: --
"It might seem that from the existenoe of an etfect at 
~he present time we cannot prove the present existence of its 
~ause ••• This apparent difficulty will be solved if we take note 
~t the differenoe between what is called a oause in fieri, that 
lis, the oause of the thingts beooming, and the oause In esse, 
Ithat is, the cause of the thingt8 being. Now the becomIng of a 
~hing takes place onoe for all, and the cause of the thing'S be-
poming must exist at the time of the thine's beooming, but need 
~ot exist thereatter ••• The existence of an etfect in the present 
~equires the present ex1stence ot its cause in esse ••• Now, it is 
~he existence in the present of the universe as an effect ot 
~od's power, and not the beginning of the universe, trom whioh we 
~gue the present existence ot God as 1ts cause. H [Mocormick, 
Natural Theology, 51.J 
6 Boyer points out that, although a series ot aociden-
~ally SUbordinated oauses oould proceed to 1nfinity, within the 
~eries there would be no sufficient reason for the saiies itself. 
~here would be no series. without a First Cause. These remarks 
~nderly Boyer's conclusion: "Wherefore even if the etern1ty ot 
the world be supposed, the need of a First cause is not taken 
away but rather increased. In acc1dentally subordinated causes, 
there is not found an ultimate reason for the ettects; however 
Ln essentially subordinated causes. it is impossible to prooeed 
to the infinite." (Boyer, Cursus Philosophiee. II, 317., 
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Thomas show~ that there must be a First Cause in such a series 
of essentially subordinated causes, and it it be supposed that 
there is not a First Cause, then no cause whatsoever could exer-
oise oausality, for, as in his proof from motion, the relation 
of all instrumental oauses to the one prinoipal oause is evident. 
If there be no first, or principal, oause, then the possibility 
of the instrumentfs exercise of oausality is destroyed. 
In the third way. the argument rrom oontingency, st. 
rI'homas distinguishes between three different types of being. He 
speaks of oontingent beings whioh are oapable of being or not 
being. They are those beings which in their very nature have the 
oapacity of not-being. of suooessively receiving various for4s. 
~hey are corporeal, corruptible, contingent beings, which are 
oapable of beine or not-being. The seoond tupe of being which he 
oonsiders may be referred to as neoessary beings whioh have and 
reoeive their necess1 ty !ro;a another. 'rhey are necessary beinss 
which have D: oause ot' their neoessity. They are those beings 
which in themselves do not have a oapaoity of reoeiving various 
forms successively, and whose essenoe is not composed of ma~uer 
and form. 'i'hey are pure forms, pure spirits, and henoe incorrup-
tible beings. st. Thomas speaks of them as neoessary, but they 
are necessary receiving their neoessity from another. The third 
type of being which 3t. Thomas mentions in this proof is the ab-
solutely and essentially neoessary being. It is that being whioh 
61 
• possesses most perfectly the reason why' it is impossible tor it 
not to exist, That reason is that its essence is its very exis-
tence. 
There is a twofold structure to this argument. In the 
tirst stage st. Thomas argues to the existence of n neoessary 
being whose neoessity depends upon some cause. He shows that not 
all things which exist can be oorruptible beings by the following 
argument. There are things in the world which are possible to be 
and not to be. Bat not all things which exist can be such, since 
~hat is possible to not be, at one time was not, for of itself 
suoh a being is nothing, since it is of itself indifferent to 
existenoe or non-existence. Wherefore if all beings were such, at 
pne time nothing existed, and nothing would here and now exist. 
~ut things do here and now exist, manitesting that there must be 
some necessary being whose necessity is derived, at least. from 
some cause. This is all that Thomas, thus tar in the proof, in-
sists upon. 
It is the second stage of his arg~~ent whioh witnesses 
his proof of the existonoe of an absolutely and essentially neces-
sary being. st. Thomas has thus tar shown that not all beings are 
merely possible, sinoe there must exist something Whose existenoe 
is necessary_ ·He continues his argument in this tashion. A neoes-
sary being either has its necessity caused by another, or it does 
not. If it does not, then an absolutely and essentially necessary 
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being is had, and the thesis stands. If it has its necessity 
caused by another, the same considerations must again be made. 
~hen st. Thomas. as he did in the first two arguments, intro-
duces the notion of an infinite regress, showing that an infinite 
series of neoessary beings whose neoessity is oaused by another 
is impossible. sinoe, as in effioient causes, if it were possible 
to go on to infinity, there would be no First Oause, any prinoi-
p1e cause, nor any intermediary oauses, so likewise here without 
a first neoessary being, whose necessity is absolutely uncaused. 7 
present-day scholastios do not propose the argument for 
the existenoe of God from contingenoy in the exaot manner as st. 
~homaSt sinoe the Thomistic argument supposes the 4oo~r1n. of the 
composition of bodies. The scholastic argument is more easily 
~nderstood than 1s Thomas' argument. and it i5 hardly neCftssary 
to summarize it here.-Their argument oonoerns itself with but 
two different types ot being--oontingent and necessary. A con-
tingent being is one which exists, but is likewise capable of not 
existing; it exists. but not by virtue of its own essenoe. A ne-
cessary being is one whioh exists and is absolutely inoapableCot 
not existing; it exists by virtue ot its own essence. with this 
twofold division of being, there is no need for a distinotion 
to be made between a being which is necessary, having a oause 
7 Gar±igou-Lagrange. The One God, 144-145. 
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of its neoessity, and a being whioh is absolutely and essentially 
neoessary.6 
The fourth Thomistioargument for the existenoe of God 
is taken from the grades of perfeotion in the world. The major of 
the argument merely states the empirioal faot that grades of per-
:fections do exist in the world. For the sake of simplioity, the 
arguclent is conveniently limited to the transoendental perfections 
whioh st. Thomas, principally if not exolusively, regards. His 
~ords are these, "There are found in things some more and less 
~ood and true and noble." 
In the minor of the argument st. Thomas applies the 
Wrinciple of suffioient reason to the empirioal faot enunoiated 
in the major. A sufficient reason is sought to explain why per-
~eotions oan exist aocording to a greater or less degree. _e-
oourse is had to the principle of exemplary oausality which st. 
~homas formulates in the following manner: "More and less are 
~redicated of different things insofar as they resemble in dif-
ferent ways something which is the greatest." It may rightly be 
said that the reason why more and less ,re so predioated of dif· 
ferent things is that they are so oonoeived, and they are so oon-
oeived, beoause it is neoessary to do so, since a diminished or 
partioipated perfection does not have within itself a suffioient 
a For a olear example of the present-day Scholastio 
argument, see Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 317-319. 
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reason why it exists. It is not self-explanatory. Could ~t ex-
plain itself, it would exist in the highest degree, for perfeo-
tion of its very nature implies no limitation. Therefore if a 
diminished or partioipated perfeotion does exist, there exists 
also a being whioh has that perfection to the infinite degree, 
of Whioh degree inferior things are but mere resemblanoes or 
imltations. 9 Furthermore there exists a being whioh is the exem 
plary oause of all things whioh have a perfection in a greater 
or less degree. since an exemplary oause is that in whose imi-
tation something exlsts. lO 
The oonclusion of the first part of the argument is 
that there exists a being which is the highest good, the highest 
truth, and the highest beauty_ And since these notions are con-
vertible with the notion ot being, sinoe they are properties of 
being, there exists a being which is the highest being, a being 
whose existence is infinite. And sinoe eXistenoe, as it were, is 
the heart and oore of every perfection sinoe every perfeotion 
1s only some mode of existenoe. it follows that his being is in-
finitely perfeot. ll 
9 Boyer, Cursus Philosophiae, II, 326-327. 
10 "Therefore it there exist essences whioh are grea-
ter or les8 degrees ot some perfeotion, it is neoessary that 
there exists a higher degree of that same perfeotion, of whioh 
degree inferior essenoes are but imitations." CIbid.' 
11 "And sinoe these perteotions are convertible with 
being, there exists a being whioh is the greatest. rt tIbid.J 
65 
• In the seoond part of this argument st. 'l'homas shows 
that this being is God Himself and is commonly acknowledge by 
~en as the efficient oause of the world and of all the perfectiona 
in thw world. 12 He appeals to the prinoiple that what is the 
~aximum in any genus is the oause of all things whioh are of that 
genus. Therefore, what does not essentially possess perteotion. 
but only by participation, must reoeive that perteotion tram some 
effioient cause. And it this oause ita.lf does not essentially 
~o8sess perfeotion, a third oause must be analyzed. And sinoe an 
. ~nfinlte regress of' efficient oauses is impossible, there exists 
~n effioient oause which essentially possesses perfeotion. But 
~hat essentially possesses perfection possesses it to the grea-
~est degree. Therefore that highest being whioh is the exemplary 
~ause of all perfections whioh exist in a f·'reater or less degree, 
~t onoe, is the effioient oause of the world, and at all the 
~erteotions whioh are found in the world.13 
The fifth way of st. Thomas is the argument from the 
~overnanoe of the world. In the major of this argument reoourse 
12 G11son, Philosophy of st. Thomas Aquinas, 90 
"AS regards the appeal to the pi'ihotple ar causality 
~t the end of the proot ••• its objeot ls by no meana to establish 
~he existence of a supreme being; that oonolusion 1s already se-
pured. Its objeot is simply to lead Us to recognize in this 
~1rst Being ••• the oause of all the perfections whio£"' appear 1n 
.eoondary things." 
13 Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 328-329. 
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is had once again to an empirical tact. It 1s evident that natu-
ral beings. beings which lack intelligence, move toward an end, 
and they do attain their end oonstantly and designedly. It should 
be noted that st. Thomas is !lare excluding the case ot man. who 
is a natural being though endowed with a certain amount. of intel-
ligence which is not SUfficient, however, to direct all other be-
ings to their end, as the argument implies. 14 But what is laokin~ 
in knowledge can act for an end only if it be directed by some-
thing or someone endowed with knowledge and intelligenoe. sinoe a 
thing aots tor an end insofar as it is ordered to an eftect as to 
its end. But such ordering supposes the abstract relation of the 
means to the end be known prio~ to the actual ordering, at least 
to the ultimate oause of such ordering. Therefore the abstraot re-
lation of the means to the end must first be known before the a-
gent be ordered to the ultimate cause of the ordering. But only 
an intelligent cause oan know this abstraot relation. Therefore, 
what aots for an ultimate end is directed by someone endowed with 
knowledge and intelligenoe.l5 st. Thomas oonoludes, then, that 
some ln~lligent being exists who direots all natural things to 
14 Ibid •• , 344. 
15 "If the end is intended, and if the effeot 1s had 
trom the intention and desire of the end. it is neoessary that 
the end be known; for nothing moves if 1t be not known and willed 
But to know and to will an end is proper only to a being endowed 
with an intelleot." tIbid.) 
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their end. This men speak ot as God. .. 
AlthOugh st. Thomas does not bridge the gap between 
his conclusion that some intelligent being exists who is respon-
sible tor the order in the world and his ultimate assertion that 
this being is God, it is nonetheless implied in the notion ot an 
ordainer possessing the exemplary ideas ot the resultant order.l 
Now the mind whenoe the order of the world proceeds either ot it 
self possesses the exemplary ideas of that order, or receives 
them trom another being. It it possesses them ot itself, it has 
them to the highest degree and must needs be a being whioh is 
superior to all other beings. In a word, that being must be God 
Himself. It, however, it reoeives them from another, and sinoe 
an infinite regress is impossible, there must exist some one in-
telleot whioh 1s the ultimate souroe of that order, namely, God 
Himselt. l ? 
16 Garrigou-Lagrange, The o~e GOd, 152. 
17 Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 348. 
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